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Introduction 
The European Convention and the preparations for the new Treaty 
have launched a new round of debates regarding the future of Europe, 
European unification and consequently the European social policy. It was 
obvious that  the discussions about the essence of the European political 
institutions and structures, culminating on the issue of 
intergovernmentalism or federalism, would certainly have had a serious 
impact in the pursue of the social construction of Europe. Under these 
circumstances, the current form of development and implementation of 
the European employment and social policy which is going mostly 
through the Open Method of Coordination (OMC)  inaugurated in an 
integrated way by the Lisbon Council of 2000 and after, has found a new 
context of appraisal of its results, of its nature as well as of its future. The 
title as well as the concept of the present conference should be perceived 
as a reflection of the overall political developments.  As the historical 
experience shows, the process and the progress of Europeanization, by 
itself, brings back continuously to the foreground the issue of the 
European social space, in other words, the issue of Europe as a social 
union. 
In our paper we attempt to raise a number of questions about the 
prospects of  social federalism in Europe taking into consideration the 
experiences accumulated by  other federal  states, as these are 
presented in the recent scientific literature . We will seek to link these 
experiences with the evolution of the   European social policy as the latter 
is developed after the adoption of the OMC in the field of employment 
and social protection. Finally, we will attempt to locate several common 
issues of future initiatives. It is obvious that the projection of the 
federalist social experience onto social-political design with the form of 
OMC that takes place within non-federalist social structures, it appears as 
an extremely difficult undertaking. For this reason, our main aim is 
mostly to articulate some questions –not all– and to attempt to provide 
some preliminary answers. 
The first question that I want to pose refers to what we mean with 
the term social federalism, within the European context. This is a 
p r e r e q u i s i t e  s o  a s  t o  f o r m  a  common base of understanding and 
dialogue.The second question, which includes a series of sub-questions, 
refers to the experience of social federalism in other countries. What 
conclusions, if any, can we draw from these, and what is their use for the 
European social policy? Does social federalism contribute to higher levels                         SOCIAL FEDERALISM, SUBSIDIARITY AND OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION    3  
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of social protection? Or is an impediment to the development and 
expansion of the welfare state? A third cluster of questions is related with 
the OMC and its role in formulating the future profile of the European 
social policy. In this particular context we pose some questions. Why just 
OMC? How can we estimate its contribution in the development of 
European social policy and European integration? Is OMC capable of 
producing results? What is its future development and its potential 
"federal content"? Finally, a fourth question is related with the form that 
a future OMC should take in order to support a federal social policy, as 
well as the conditions under which such an OMC would be successful.  
These are some of the many questions that we would like to pick for 
our discussion in the frame of a provocative and, we hope, fruitful 
framework of the conference about the relations between social 
federalism, subsidiarity and open method of coordination. 
1. How could we perceive social federalism? 
As we have noticed before, the discussion regarding the 
intergovernmental or the federal character of the Union has unavoidably 
affected other sub sectors including the field of social policy. In this 
frame, both the academic community and policy makers have embarked 
in a more intensive research and exploration of the experiences as well as 
the lessons from federal social policies. Thus, they focus their interests on 
federal states that they have, more or less, federalist structures. Those 
with bolder views have moved forward to state a first approach for a 
European social federalism (Peters 2003). Others, studying the federal 
sociopolitical experience of other countries and especially income 
redistribution, have expressed their hesitations for a federalist future 
recommending instead the full development of the dynamics of the OMC 
and proposing pan-European binding agreements for minimal social 
standards. Yet, they are entrusting the functions of the income 
redistribution between rich and poor countries and regions to the 
institutions of the European Union through structural funding of 
development policies in infrastructure, education, employment and public 
services (Cantillon 2003). 
Nevertheless, beyond the special conditions which define the 
context of the social federalism discussion, there is a need to clarify and 
study both the notion of social federalism as well as its practical 
implementation. In addition to this, we have to agree upon the meaning 
of the term “social federalism in Europe”, for there is a difference in the 
approaches between the different scientists as it is expressed by the two 
aforementioned scholars. The first study, intending to formulate a 
comprehensive theory of social federalism in Europe,  is preoccupied 4   THEODOROS SAKELLAROPOULOS 
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mostly with the legal recognition of regional or local competencies in the 
fields of employment, social exclusion or health care, as it is recognized 
in several constitutions of member states.“We prefer a clear, not a soft 
law approach to the division of competencies between member states and 
European Union; in such a clear division, full competence of the 
constituent elements can be guaranteed, as learns us the experience of 
the federal states having recognised legislative and other powers e.g. in 
areas of health care or social assistance to the regions or local 
authorities, within a pre-established federal framework. It is exactly such 
a binding framework we have also to reflect upon in the context of the 
European Union”. (Peters 2003:14) 
On the other hand, in the second approach, social federalism is 
perceived as central redistribution of income. In this context fiscal 
federalism is a presupposition. The example of social assistance in United 
States is a case in point. In that case, the conclusions that accrue from a 
comparison between USA and Europe in favor of a European social 
federalism are not encouraged. “The comparison suggests that European 
social subsidiarity has not hindered the post-war development of Europe’s 
welfare states. Quite to the contrary in fact. Conversely, American social 
federalism would appear to have rather stood in the way of the 
realization of social redistribution” (Cantillion, 2004) 
From the above, it is obvious that a sober and objective discussion 
on the meaning of social federalism and the future of the European social 
policy needs a unified or, at least, an agreed approach so as to evaluate 
as much objectively as possible the current experience of the federal 
states. The typology, the forms and the levels at which federal social 
policy is exercised are so many and the procedures of homogenization so 
complex that, as it is commonly accepted, constructing a typology of 
them is very difficult. However, for the needs of our discussion we can 
agree in a broad and comprehensive understanding, that, as federalist 
social policy we should perceive a system of social policy provisions and 
regulations  with -hierarchically constructed or not, yet institutionalized in 
constitutions or laws- many levels of decision making (federal, states, 
regions, localities, etc), funding, organization, provision of services and 
benefits. Within such a broad framework, we could study the experience 
of federal social policies and their value for the future of the European 
social policy. 
2. Welfare and  Federalism: some observations 
In analyzing social federalism some conclusions from the federal 
countries are valuable. Five remarks:                         SOCIAL FEDERALISM, SUBSIDIARITY AND OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION    5  
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The first remark has to do with the relation between federalism and 
welfare state. Is federalism and welfare antagonistic? The dichotomist 
view for Unitarian and federal states implies the idea that decentralization 
and federalist structures are liberal and market preserving, and are 
negatively disposed of redistribution and the social programms due to the 
divided powers and the multiple vetoes in decision making. Federalism 
introduces antagonism between the federal entities, resulting to the 
decrease in social spending and the race to the bottom. According to this 
view, decentralization and federalist structures are an impediment to the 
expansion and development of welfare state. This view was established 
from the fact that federal states had low levels of social expenditures in 
relation to their GDP and a weak welfare state. (Schmidt, 2002).However 
if this holds true in the case of USA and Switzerland it does not apply to 
other federal states as Germany, Austria, Belgium, whose social spending 
in relation to GDP is among the highest. In Germany, social spending 
reaches the 30% of the GDP, a little bit lower from countries like France, 
Sweden, and Holland (see Table 1).  
Consequently, the relation between federalism and welfare state is 
not one-dimensional or unilateral as is implied by the research that focus 
exclusively on the case of some big states as the USA. Federalism and 
welfare state are fully compatible qualities and this is proven by 
experience. Simply, we have to study in each particular case the specific 
circumstances that existed or that were formed for the development or 
the contraction of the welfare state in federal systems. 
 
 
Table 1 
The relative size of Federal and non-Federal Welfare States 
(1997) 
 
 
 
Country        
 
_____A____
_ 
Public social 
expenditure as 
percent of GDP 
 
_______B__
_____ 
 
Column A 
minus taxes 
_______C__
_____ 
 
Column B 
plus 
Tax 
expenditures 
Denmark  35.9 %  26.7 %  26.7 % 
Sweden  35.7 28.5 28.5 
Finland  33.3 24.8 24.8 
Belgium  30.4 25.8 26.3 
Norway  30.2 24.4 24.4 6   THEODOROS SAKELLAROPOULOS 
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Italy  29.4 24.1 24.1 
Germany 29.2 25.5 25.5 
Austria  28.5 23.0 23.4 
Netherlands  27.1 20.2 20.3 
United 
Kingdom 
23.8 21.1 21.6 
Czech 
Republic 
21.7 19.3 19.3 
Canada  20.7 17.8 18.7 
New  Zealand  20.7 17.0 17.0 
Ireland  19.6 16.7 17.1 
Australia 18.7 17.6 17.9 
United 
States 
15.8 15.0 16.4 
Japan  15.1 14.4 14.8 
Average  25.6 %  21.3 %  21.6 % 
Source: Adema, W., 2001, Net Social Expenditure, (2
nd ed.), OECD, 
Paris, Table 7. 
 
A second remark has to do with the type of federalism. The 
recurrent dichotomy between federal and non federal systems is 
obsolete. Federal political systems do constitute neither a unified 
category nor an aggregate of many single cases. Recent bibliography has 
shown convincingly, using the criterion of institutional, political and 
cultural diversity, that federal systems are distinguished as majoritarian 
and multinational federations. The first type accrued from the need to 
govern democratically relatively large communities. United States falls 
into this type, as well as Germany and Australia. The separation of 
powers and of responsibilities was pursued so as to achieve a balance 
between the majoritarian institutions. The second type has to do with the 
need to provide autonomy to the ethnic, linguistic minorities in pluralistic 
and multiethnic countries. Among this type we can locate Canada, 
Belgium, and Switzerland. In this case, the aim of federalism has been to 
accommodate linguistic or cultural diversity. For these countries 
federalism constitutes a basic political condition. (Lijphard, 1999).  
This distinction, although it enjoys gradually a wider approval in 
federalism’s bibliography, in the studies analyzing public policy “has had 
almost no place” (Noël, 2003:5).Some first attempts were  only 
undertaken in the field of employment policy.  (Noël, 2003). For the 
further research on a possible European social federalism this distinction 
is, however, of great methodological and essential significance since both                         SOCIAL FEDERALISM, SUBSIDIARITY AND OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION    7  
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona"  56/2005 
types include advanced welfare structures created by historically different 
conditions and affected decisively its current efficiency and legitimacy. 
Yet, both types are characterized by constitutional decentralized, sub-
national or local arrangements. 
A third remark has to do with the causes and the driving forces that 
propelled the procedures for the development of social institutions and 
the welfare state in federal states of both types. These forces are the 
same with the forces that promoted the formation of welfare states in 
non federal countries. They are multiple, they differ from country to 
country and in general are reflected by the different theoretical 
approaches. Socio-economic forces (functional theory), work, ethic and 
state- intervention tradition (socio-cultural theory), class struggle (power 
resources and partisan theory)  have, separately or cumulatively, played 
a crucial role in the modern formation of welfare states in federations in 
the same way as  political-institutional factors,  territorial politics and 
state-craft building. Schmidt (2002) underlies the three paths that 
contributed to the development of an advanced welfare state in the 
German Federation. a) The political ideas and the long standing tradition 
of state led amelioration and political control of the economy. b) The 
party competition between two encompassing welfare state parties. c) 
The federalistic constitutional structures, historical legacies and the 
distribution of costs and benefits of the welfare state. In Canada, the 
need for national integration and state-craft building has played an 
important role in the construction of the post-war welfare state ( Banting, 
1995 ). As Obringer shows (1998) the role of political institutions, i.e. of 
the federal structures and direct democracy, explain mainly the growth of 
welfare state in Switzerland. 
A l t h o u g h  E u r o p e  a s  e n t i t y   i s  n o w  i n  a  d i f f e r e n t  h i s t o r i c a l  a n d  
developmental phase than the federal states some decades earlier, and 
historical analogies have less explanatory power in this context, one can 
legitimately  pose the question if analogous driving forces have been 
emerged for promoting social integration. The idea of a "European social 
model" does not seem to be, until now, the powerful political idea which 
could significantly push social Europe further. The pan-European parties 
are just doing their first steps, while the European Parliament has still 
restricted competencies. Finally, there is no serious intention for 
territorial unity or state-craft building. For the construction of a strong 
and comprehensive federal social Europe there is a need for a resolute 
political will. The Convention did not met this need. 
A fourth remark relates to the way social federalism was evolved. 
Was the later a unique historical construction or it reflects an ongoing 
process where continuity elements coexist with discontinuity (reforms)? 8   THEODOROS SAKELLAROPOULOS 
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To answer this question concerning the way and the time of appearance 
of the welfare state in the federations is very important as regards the 
European perspective. A comparative historical approach points out that 
the incremental, piecemeal and creeping welfare state development 
seems to be typical for federations like Swiss, USA and Canada (Obringer 
1998:260, Noël et al. 2003). The reasons for that are not located only in 
the federal structures, which demand continuous policy compromises. 
There is a vast array of historical, social, ethnic, race and cultural factors 
of small, medium and long-term duration, which influenced and continue 
to influence the path of development in every case, so that we can not 
easily discern one model of social federalism even within the same 
country in the long run. Even more so that federalism as a form of 
political organization is expressed in various forms of functional and 
institutional interrelations (Watts 1999). A linear and balanced 
development is not characteristic for social federal systems in general. 
After a first phase of decentralized initiatives, social programs in Canada 
for a long period of time resembled a type of welfare state reminiscent of 
a unitary state (Noel  et al.2003). Moreover, exceptional events, such as 
the great economic recession of the 30s, played an important role in the 
introduction of a central system of social security and redistribution in the 
USA (Social Security Act 1935). However, the devolvement of 
decentralized competences and regulations in the states and communities 
as in the case of ADC (Aid for Dependent Children) did not strengthen -
instead it weakened- the federal character of public policy, as the black 
children of the South were excluded from the provisions (Lieberman and 
Lapivski 2001: 329). If these observations have any meaning for the 
European experiment, this lies to the open, no-ended ,continuous, and 
some times contradictory,  process of the social  integration. 
A fifth remark has to do with the enormous innovative potential that 
the decentralized constituencies incorporate regarding the welfare 
policies. Most scholars agree on this conclusion (Liebfried and Pierson 
1995, Obringer 1998). This is the case especially on social policies that 
are executed better on a micro level, like the social services, social 
inclusion, health, employment. The institutional strengthening of the 
decentralized units benefits the trend for innovative solutions. In view of 
a European social federalism this issue deserves closer consideration 
since it includes an enormous potential on operational level.  
3. European Subsidiarity and Open Method of 
Coordination 
European Social Policy is designed and impemented until now on 
the base of the principle of subsidiarity. The E.U member states have the                         SOCIAL FEDERALISM, SUBSIDIARITY AND OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION    9  
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main responsibility for the design, organization and funding of their own 
national social programmes. Brussels acts only and when the member 
states are unwilling or when it is necessary for reasons of effectiveness 
and scale. The deeper meaning of this principle is that decisions should 
be taken as much closer as possible to the people and by the lowest level 
of power. This was and is the guiding principle in the formation of the 
current European social policy and the recent European Constitution did 
not present any changes to it.  
Starting from this point of view and observing the poor performance 
since the establishment of European Union in the production of central, 
pan-European social programmes, legislative regulations and 
interventions, many academics, politicians and activists claim that a 
E u r o p e a n  s o c i a l  p o l i c y  d o e s  n o t  e x i s t .  W h a t  m a t t e r s  i s  m o s t l y ,  t h e  
absence of a central pan-European mechanism for personal and national 
redistribution of resources that will aim to a unified social protection of all 
European citizens. Thus, they conclude that European unification does not 
go hand in hand with the formulation of a common European social space 
where social rights are secured and distributed equally to all European 
citizens (Kleinman and Piachaud  1993.) These views were expressed 
mainly in the past and they represent still a very powerful stream in the 
European discussion. At the beginning they were the result of a federal 
approach concerning the European integration and the fears that a 
competitive federalism could be emerged. Central interventions with the 
aim of the harmonization of social policies in order to avoid phenomena of 
social dumping were suggested. In a latter stage of the European 
integration the functionalist approach was prevailed and the 
harmonization process was presented again, but this time in a rather 
optimistic manner. It can be expected that the results of a faster 
economic integration will spill over in an easy and dynamic way to the 
social field and to social policies leading to a federal cooperative Europe.  
This was the approach of the spill-over effect (Kleinman 2002). 
The “Multi-level governance approach” (MLG) from mid nineties 
(Liebfried-Pierson 1995) has broaden considerably the methodological 
point of view, the analytical framework and the research field on issues of 
European social policy. Avoiding the one-dimensional, unitary and static 
analysis that had its roots in the historical precedence of the national 
welfare states or the debate between supranationalism and 
intergovermentalism, MLG perceived EU as a whole, consequently and 
the social space, as a multi-tiered system of multiple and overlapping 
levels of decision-making, organization and funding in supranational, 
national sub-national and local level. All these together contribute to a 
final result. According to this view, a European social policy was and is 10   THEODOROS SAKELLAROPOULOS 
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already present, develops and contributes actively to the effectiveness 
and legitimation of European integration. It incorporates national and 
supra-national (European) social programs, institutions, and 
redistribution processes as well as their interconnections (Streeck 1995). 
A harmonization or convergence of the social systems of the member 
states is not possible due to the national and cultural diversity prevailed 
in Europe. 
A logical and crucial result of this new perception of the European 
social policy and integration was the wholehearted adoption of the Open 
Method of Coordination at Lisbon Summit of 2000 in the fields of 
employment and social inclusion,(European Council 2000) and afterwards 
to pensions and health. Adhering to the principle of subsidiarity as well as 
to the national and cultural diversity of Europe, OMC was developed and 
develops as a complementary tool of soft policy on the side of the 
traditional European method. It implies mutual learning, benchmarking, 
multilateral surveillance and the commitment on common goals Europe-
wide. It does not have a legislative basis; neither it obliges member 
states to obey. It is developed on a volunteer basis and the commitments 
that accrue out of it are of a political and moral nature. It is also 
characterized as active subsidiarity (Begg and Berghman 2002; 
Vandenbroucke 2002b). In what follows we will focus our analysis in 
three basic questions: 1) Under which conditions was OMC introduced  as 
a soft tool in the European social policy?  
2) Which is the precise role of the OMC concerning Europeanization? 
3) Is OMC capable of producing results and what are the results so far? 
Which is the future development of OMC? 
So, why the introduction of OMC in social protection took place in 
the year 2000 in Lisbon and not a few years earlier? Wasn’t the 
benchmarking procedure, good practices and mutual learning known 
before? In administrative science, especially in the private sector, such 
methods were known for many years (Schaefer 2002). Many attribute the 
above timing in the fact that the majority of European governments in 
that period were headed by socialists. Although this fact made the above 
decision possible, it does not in itself explain the decision taken. Which 
were the conditions that determined the specific content?  
The timing of the full deployment of the OMC after 2000 in the 
fields of employment and social protection coincides with the plan for 
economic and monetary union of Europe (EMU) and the introduction of 
the Euro. The path towards an economic unification of Europe should 
unavoidably be accompanied with a social union side, in order for the 
EMU to be convincing to the European citizens and the prospect of 
Europeanization to be justified in their consciousness, especially after the                         SOCIAL FEDERALISM, SUBSIDIARITY AND OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION    11 
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stiff economic and fiscal policies of the member states along the 
Maastricht criteria throughout the 90s. Economic recession and high 
unemployment in pan European level did not leave any room for inaction 
in the social field. European trade unions and social-oriented political 
forces were exerting pressure towards this direction. Since 1997 with the 
Amsterdam treaty, the pressure of the European trade unions led to the 
inclusion of the articles on Employment.  
It’s interesting to refer to similar international developments. The 
same pressure in the direction of an economic and social union broke out 
in other federal states as well, as in Canada, when they were trying to 
overcome the problems of recession, fiscal debts and unemployment, 
through greater economic unification and fiscal (spending) cuts. The 
Social Union Framework Agreement (SUFA, 1999) between the federal 
government and the provincial governments in Canada, irrespective of 
the final outcome, illustrates a similar connection between economic and 
social targets in conditions of spending cuts, increasing social problems 
and efforts of legitimizing a greater economic unification. The fact that 
SUFA was very limited, mainly a procedural agreement that did not bring 
in the desired results (Noël et al., 2003), does not change the fact that in 
both the EU and Canada intense trends were noted towards a social union 
alongside the economic union. 
In both the EU and Canada the aimed social union was inclusive of a 
double compromise of the forces that promoted economic union with the 
social-oriented forces. The first part of the compromise expresses the 
addition of social goals alongside the economic goals. The austere fiscal 
policy of the member states, which was imposed by Maastricht (EU), and 
the reduction of central (federal) spending (Canada), was exchanged with 
agreements over the social union. The second part of the compromise 
concerned the content of a social union. Not central redistribution, pan 
European or pan Canadian social programs or any other regulation which 
could promote a positive integration, but a choice of “soft” methods, 
institutions and procedures of social intervention, which would not 
increase social expenditure and would not disturb the free market forces 
and competition. SUFA was characterized as an agreement only for 
procedural affairs. It had very little to do with real social policy, since the 
federal central government intervention degenerated the aims of the 
provincial governments for substantive social regulations as a trade off to 
the federal spending cuts. Similar reservations were expressed for the 
OMC and its future development in Europe as we will see in the following. 
From the above, it is clear that OMC and other soft instruments or 
procedures were introduced and became typical for social purposes in the 
process of building bigger regional entities in the age of globalization. 12   THEODOROS SAKELLAROPOULOS 
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The second question about OMC concerns its relation with the 
Europeanization process. To a large extend the argument has to do with 
the role and the aims of European social policy, as this is defined by 
various economic, social and political forces. Do the OMC form a means 
of convergence of the various social systems of the EU countries, 
reducing regional, national and local inequalities and delivering equal 
rights to the European citizens? Or OMC is just a means of formal 
legitimation of the European unification, which does not produce any 
direct substantive results, but consumes itself in conversations, texts, 
researches, communications, congresses etc, leaving the market forces 
totally free to shape up the future of European unification? 
 It’s obvious that in both questions, theoretically, both performance 
and legitimation aspects co-exist. The crucial point is, however, if and 
when these specific results make their appearance. It is certain that in 
the second case the amelioration of the social problems, only through the 
market forces as a spillover effect of economic growth and unification, 
will be delayed. The legitimation of the Europeanization process will be 
formal for a short or long period of time and will not play the role which is 
expected to play. 
This dichotomy cuts across –consciously or unconsciously- all the 
relevant bibliography on the OMC and European Social Policy. A large part 
of this bibliography links the OMC with the legitimation of the 
Europeanization process and the national and cultural diversity of 
European countries. In this context European Social Policy is the totality 
of central (from Brussels) social regulation and redistribution, member-
states’ social policies and their interrelations. Social rights are protected 
through national legal orders and social protection is better and more 
effectively organized and financed on a national level (Hemerijck, 2003). 
On the other hand, in the context of the convergence approach, a 
central European social redistribution, accompanied by central European 
regulations in the social field must be the goal of a European social policy 
which brings results and legitimizes the Europeanization process. This 
a p p r o a c h  i s  m o r e  c a u t i o u s  a s  r e g a rds the OMC, and in any case it 
suggests its transformation in obligatory rules and regulations and 
underscores the need for the Europeanization of social rights. 
Both points of view, in different variations according to every 
writer’s opinion, aim at determining and influencing the OMC to their 
desired direction. The same is true with the various economic, social and 
political forces. For many scholars OMC remains a soft method of mutual 
learning between technocratic elites and nothing more (Delaporte and 
Pohhet, 2002b). Others believe that OMC must be diffused to all 
interested parties. Transparency and participation must become basic                         SOCIAL FEDERALISM, SUBSIDIARITY AND OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION    13 
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features of the OMC (Della Porte). Agreement on targets and a 
convergence on social indicators may form a good basis for 
benchmarking, evaluation and recommendations for the member states 
in order to adjust their social policies towards greater efficiency and 
legitimation (Atkinson et al., 2002). The institutional foundation of the 
OMC in binding rules and the obligatory nature of reaching certain social 
indicators can help the substantiation of the OMC, mainly as regards 
efficiency and a firm and stable policy environment in a Europe of 25 
member states (Peters, 2003; Cantillon, 2004).   
Since OMC has become a reality in social policy and since we have 
experienced the development of  socio-political antagonisms that aim to 
influence it, we must consider the OMC as a dynamic field of sociopolitical 
intervention in a European level which contains all possible solutions. The 
pace, direction and fields of its growth will be determined from the 
balance of political and social forces, exactly because the set goals are 
primarily political. A total “big” OMC type of umbrella for social protection 
and employment seems less likely since it presupposes ambitious political 
initiatives which are connected with big events in the process of European 
unification. Such an opportunity was the European Convention 
(Sakellaropoulos 2004). 
Under the present circumstances "small" OMsC in different fields 
must and should be converted in living laboratories of mutual learning, 
democratic participation and transparency not only for the national and 
European technocratic elites, but for the lower levels of decision making 
as well. Existing delays in transparency and democratic participation in 
the planning and execution of OMC do not offer a higher level of 
legitimation in the process of European unification, have a minor impact 
on the mutual learning mechanisms and diminish the connecting potential 
of the OMC between the different welfare regimes in Europe 
(Sakellaropoulos 2004). 
The third question, which is linked with the second, is if the OMC 
can produce real results and how. It is obvious that this question 
concerns both the real results of European social policy and results in 
improvising the procedure itself (Sakellaropoulos 2004).  
Considering the prevailing perceptions about OMC, it would be 
unrealistic to make the OMC and the European social policy responsible 
for the overall performance in employment and social security in Europe. 
The High Level Group points it out very clearly  in its Report on the future 
of social policy in an enlarged European Union: "Taking in consideration 
the differences between Member -States, European social policy should 
define common objectives and not try to harmonize the social systems, 
which is both impossible and incompatible with the European political 14   THEODOROS SAKELLAROPOULOS 
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framework"(European Commission 2004:36). Regarding the OMC it is 
noted that "Its added value lies in the definition of clear policy choices 
and its policy-making capacity". It provides a "framework for action at 
national level...Rather than making a ranking of performance, it uses 
benchmarks with a view to organize a learning process and to help 
exchange experience" (European Commission 2004:76,72). 
But even in this frame   the evaluation of the OMC faces two 
difficulties: the first is the delimitation of what is national and what 
European is. Is national socio-political performance due to the national 
programs or the OMCs? The second difficulty concerns the object of the 
evaluation. In reality, what can be judged -and was indeed judged- it’s 
the 5-year European Employment Strategy (EES), the first program on 
Social Inclusion (2001-2003) and the NAPs/incl. of the second generation 
where we have a fully-fledged growth of the OMC. We cannot evaluate 
the co-ordination in Pensions and Health, as it is not mature yet. 
As far as the EES concerns,  the European Commission states that 
considerable structural improvements are introduced in the labor market 
during the last five years. The general employment performance is 
difficult to be connected with the national policies and NAP’s. However, a 
remarkable convergence of  national employment policies with the 
objectives and guidelines of  EES is ascertained (Commission, 2002:7). 
Yet, a tendency of the member states towards a better performances 
policy of the EU is also observed (Begg and Berhman  2002:192). Other 
scholars dispute this ascertainment as they consider the results of the 
convergence mediocre, at least in their initial stage (Goechy: 1999), the 
results at a national level questionable and the general results limited in a 
discursive level (Delaporte and Pohhet: 2002b:53). 
Concerning the OMC itself, the High Level Group on the future of 
social policy, notes recently that the “OMC has proved remarkably 
successful in employment policy and has had very positive effects in 
social inclusion” as the new NAPs/incl. show (European Commission 
2004: 36). However, even in the most single understanding of OMC as 
learning process and exchange of experience, it is ascertained that “the 
number of good practices reviewed each year is limited and conclusions 
are not widely debated” (Employment Taskforce 2003: 59) 
Similar weaknesses have been indicated by scholars almost in every 
coordination process on social inclusion, protection and employment 
(Delaporte and Pohhet: 2002b, Sakellaropoulos 2004, Trubek and Mosher 
2003, Ferrera et al. 2002:236). 
4. Social federalism and OMC                         SOCIAL FEDERALISM, SUBSIDIARITY AND OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION    15 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona"  56/2005 
After the above short clarifications about the nature, function and 
potentials of OMC we turn back to our focus. We argue that OMC 
potentially includes both elements of social federalism: the central and 
the decentralized. If the central element is evident through the common 
objectives and the sum of social indicators, the decentralized element is 
evident through the roles provided for the lower levels of decision 
making, like the regions, social partners and democratic participation and 
the sub-indicators. When the Lisbon Council established the OMC, had 
underlined at the same time that "a fully decentralized approach will be 
applied in line with the principle of subsidiarity in which the Union, the 
Member States, the regional and local levels, as well as the social 
partners and civil society, will be actively involved, using varied forms of 
partnership"(European Council, 2000) . Nevertheless, efficiency and 
legitimacy remain as important on micro-level as on the central one. In 
both cases the activation of this potential demands the full maturity of 
the mutual learning and experience exchanges procedures in pan- 
European level and their subsequent institutional foundation via European 
law. Decentralized, federal structures need legal certainty and support in 
order to develop their innovative possibilities. 
The legal frame is a necessary precondition for successful 
implementation of federal patterns. Among other things, it expresses the 
presense of a strong political will. The concrete ways and the methods to 
create it, it is a subject that, I hope, it will be discussed by the jurists and 
law-makers in our conference. Nevertheless the legal basis is not a 
sufficient condition. Sociological, ideological, even theoretical factors 
exercise also a significant influence on real processes. I have shown 
elsewhere the dialectic relation between interior and exterior conditions 
for successful implementation of OMC ( Sakellaropoulos 2004:80-5). 
Such conditions are apparent and must also be considered in this case. 
The first condition is related with the existence of a federal society. 
For a long time the discussion about federalism was focused rather on its 
political characteristics and institutional structures. Successes or failures 
were explained on this basis. This approach has recently changed. 
Successful federal examples and performances are connected with federal 
social structures .A federal society, where national, cultural, and linguistic 
diversity prevails, initiate, facilitate and implement easier  decentralized 
policies.(Watts 1999:14-5,Livingston 1956:1-2). As far as Europe is 
concerned this is real a challenge for further research. 
The second condition is the existence of a theoretical and ideological 
environment or reference context in favor of federal policies. 
Regionalism, new localism, communitarism and other theories were 
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positive environment for institutionalizing decentralized decision-making 
processes and structures. (Powell 2004). Minority's rights are now 
recognized. The demand for democracy has penetrated every cell of 
European societies. Nationalism and etatism are not so much influential 
any more as previously. Yet, the process of globalization itself pushes 
towards greater economic, social and cultural development of regions, 
cities and communities. International organizations devote a large part of 
their means and activities to promoting decentralized societal entities and 
regional thinking.  Within this context federal suggestions and plans in 
Europe can not be easily disputed.  
The third condition is related to the subjects and the forces 
promoting social federalism. Who will define the content and the fields of 
future federal initiatives? Elites, the people or both? Broader agreements 
in different areas are welcomed. In the questionnaire of Peters (2003) the 
European and national parliamentarians were asked and answered about 
the possible fields of federal social interventions. In other questionnaires 
the citizens rejected decentralized provision of social security 
(Baudenwyns and Dandoy, 2003). 
Success requires, however, public support and legitimacy. A fully 
participative OMC can contribute significantly in the preparation and 
implementation of federal solutions. 
If we wish to consider the OMC in social protection as a preparatory 
stage for a future social federalism in its decentralized dimension, then 
three immediate courses of action are required:  
First, as initial step, the collection and yearly publishing of a Report 
about the state of the federal policies in Europe.  
Secondly, the creation of a net of the existing decentralized 
structures in each member state, either independently or in the 
framework of the Committee of the Regions, which will actively 
participate in the planning and implementation of OMC and make 
proposals to the EU bodies. 
 And third, a wide pan- European campaign for the participation of 
all decentralized levels of decision making in the planning of OMC in 
employment and social security.  
5. Conclusions 
We examined thus far some important aspects of the federal social 
systems, of the European social policy and the OMC. A common element 
in these comparisons proved to be the multilevel character of function 
and organization of these systems in providing social protection. 
However, on a legal level where obligatory rules are made which create 
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is formed in a central and decentralized level, whereas in the second case 
(EU) it is formed mainly in an intermediate ,“quasi decentralized”, that is 
national, level. What is missing is the central European level and the 
smaller decentralized units, localities etc., with the exception of the 
related provisions of the national constitutions. The level of social 
protection in both groups of countries does not depend so much on their 
federal or non-federal character. We can find developed welfare states in 
both federal and non federal countries. Historical, national, institutional, 
political, economic and cultural conditions played and continue to play an 
important role in the forming of social protection. Thus, the requirement 
for federal social structures in Europe does not have to do with questions 
of “better” or “worse” welfare performance of the federal states. Reducing 
social inequalities in the interior of the EU is primarily and exclusively a 
duty of the national governments. The European Union neither wishes nor 
tries to play this role due to the subsidiarity principle and the lack of 
respective mechanisms. What’s left, therefore, is a process of legitimation 
of the European unification and of mutual learning for enhancing the 
national efforts. In this context, the existing OMC or many OMsC can 
easily play their role. Any further progress presupposes implementation 
of common goals and common indicators under a bounding Maastricht-
type framework. A hard co-ordination, which will include two or three 
indicators, like unemployment, poverty and social exclusion and a 
minimum income level, must form the basis of an agreement just like the 
Maastricht criteria.  
Since European unification is a continuous process, the failure of 
including social provisions in the new European Constitution must not 
lead us to stop formulating new proposals and suggestions. The 
institutionalized decentralization of social protection as D. Pieters 
suggested in the issues of employment, health and social exclusion must 
continue to be at the center of our interests. Even  more so that in this 
micro-level the federal systems have proven their capacity for path-
breaking solutions.  
On the other hand the effort of central regulations or redistribution 
in pan – European level can focus on less ambitious but of symbolic value 
issues, like the formation of a common European framework for disable 
people (Sakellaropoulos 2004). There is as well ample room for pan – 
European solutions (of which type, can be discussed) in confronting new 
social risks and the new social challenges that are linked with the new 
architecture of the welfare state. I can think of a child and family 
centered social policy, which can be planned from scratch in a pan –
European level. It is obvious that in order to meet such challenges, the 
existing mechanisms and methods of OMC are insufficient. Obligatory 18   THEODOROS SAKELLAROPOULOS 
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regulations and new European institutions will be required. As the 
development of European social policy shows, its methods, tools and 
results (including the OMC) are in close relation with a certain historicity 
and the stages of promoting European unification. Such types of federal 
social institutions though – as the experience of the federal welfare states 
shows- is a result of a gradual and continuous course of development and 
of some sudden economic, political and other changes which reconstruct 
the decision making process and policy directions. Take all these in 
consideration, federal social policy in Europe remains an open, non 
ending   process.  
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